This paper studies methods for evaluating instruction in higher education. We explore student evaluations of instruction and a variety of alternatives. We develop a simple model to illustrate the biases inherent in student evaluations. Measuring learning using grades in future courses, we show that student evaluations are positively related to current grades but uncorrelated with learning once current grades are controlled. We offer evidence that the weak relationship between learning and student evaluations arises in part because students are not aware of how much they have learned in a course. We conclude with a discussion of alternative methods for evaluating teaching.
I. Introduction
This paper considers methods for assessing performance in higher education. Evaluations are important for diagnosing and correcting teaching problems and for faculty performance reviews. Moreover, with the Miller Commission's focus on accountability in higher education, evaluation methods are receiving increasing public attention (United States Department of Education [2006] ; Golden [2006] ). While assessment is never easy, the wide-range of subjects taught makes assessment in higher education particularly difficult. Given the costs and difficulty of comprehensive assessments of teaching effectiveness, student evaluations traditionally have been the primary, if not the only, means of assessing teaching in higher education. 1 We employ three constructs to assess teaching performance. First, we employ student evaluations of teaching. We also estimate learning in a section based on the grades that students receive in subsequent classes. An advantage of this measure is that it weights knowledge in proportion to its importance in future work. Lastly, we study the factors that determine whether students take additional courses in the area. 2 The second and third measures have the advantage of being intuitively simple and only require information that is readily available. 3 We study the relationship between these performance measures and how instructor characteristics including gender, foreign birth, tenure-track status, and graduate-student status, as well as course characteristics relate them.
Given student evaluations' prominence in measuring instructor performance, much of the analysis focuses on them, and we begin with a simple model of the determinants of student evaluations. We use our model to clarify the factors that affect evaluations, to study the welfare implications of using student evaluations to evaluate teaching, and to develop alternative evaluation criteria. Both economists and educational psychologists have studied how grades and 1 White (1995) reports that SEI scores are the predominant measure of teaching effectiveness used by economics departments. He notes that there appears to be strong reluctance to rely on direct observation of teaching, particularly among research-oriented departments. 2 Two obvious additional measures are drop rates and wait lists. Wait lists are uncommon in these courses and the measure of drop rates includes students who dropped before the beginning of the class as well as those who dropped once the course began.
learning affect student evaluations but, to the best of our knowledge, no studies consider both factors together. We assume that students care about their grades, the amount they learn, and the course experience. We show that in order to estimate the effects on student evaluations of learning or human capital and "grading leniency" -grades conditional on learning -both variables must be included simultaneously. This is because classes in which students learn more may receive higher grades and thus give higher evaluations. We also show that student evaluations likely place too little weight on learning and generate an incentive for instructors to inflate grades.
The present work fits into an emerging literature on the determinants of outcomes in higher education (see Bettinger and Long [2004] ; Beddard and Kuhn [2005] ; and Hoffmann and Oreopoulos [2006] ). It relates to a large literature in the economics of education on the determinants of student outcomes in primary and secondary education.
There is also a rich literature on student evaluations of teaching, comprising thousands of pieces (Feldman [1997] ), in educational psychology. Fortunately there are a number of largescale literature reviews. This literature focuses on the relationship between student evaluations and various measures of learning and generally finds a strong relationship. The most persuasive evidence for a link between learning and evaluations comes from multi-section courses with common syllabi and exams (Cohen [1981] ; Dowell and Neal [1982] ; Marsh [1984 Marsh [ , 1987 Marsh [ , 2006 ; Abrami, d'Apollonia, and Rosenfield [1997] ; Feldman [1997] ; and Theall and Feldman [2006] ).
The lack of instructor discretion in these courses leads one to question the extent to which these results will generalize to other courses. More importantly, this design is not suitable for separating the effect of grades from that of learning on evaluations because there is little if any variation in grades conditional on learning. Interestingly, discussions with some of our students suggest that they estimate how much they have learned in a course from the grade that they expect to receive, so that in multi-section classes, students' estimates of their learning will be particularly highly correlated with their grades. This literature has noted that estimates of the effect of learning on student evaluations may be biased by grades. Because the multi-section design essentially makes it impossible to separately estimate the effect of grades and learning, educational psychologists have generally relied on indirect methods to address the effect of grading leniency (see, for instance, Greenwald and Gillmore [1997] ). 4 The economics of education literature has provided evidence that student evaluations are related to grades and argued that the use of evaluations may lead to grade inflation. 5 Empirical work linking expected grades to evaluations is mixed. 6 We depart from this work in two ways.
First, we use actual course grades rather than expected grades. While students generally do not receive grades until after completing their evaluations, students have some idea of what grades they may receive based on midterm results; homework scores; and other objective information on their course performance as well as conscious or unconscious indications from the instructor.
Unlike most of the literature, we measure grades at the course level rather than at the student level. In an individual-level regression, most of the variation in grades arises from individual differences in grades within a section. So the individual level relationship between grades and evaluations indicates whether students who are at the top of a given section give higher evaluations than those at the bottom of that section, not whether instructors who grade more leniently receive higher evaluations.
While educational psychologists and economists have both studied how student 4 In the economics literature Sheets, Topping, and Hoftyzer [1995] employ a multi-section approach. Shmanske [1988] uses grades in a subsequent course in a two-course sequence, which is related to our approach but much less widely applicable. Neither study includes current grades. 5 Becker and Watts (1999) criticize economics department for "following the herd" in their uncritical use of SEI measures and not applying the same rigor they require of published research to the use and understanding of "teaching-quality" survey instruments to evaluate the performance of their faculty. Kanagaretnam, Mathieu, and Thevaranjan (2003) cite several articles from the Chronicle of Higher Education dealing with the topic of the impact of SEI's on student learning and grade inflation. McKenzie (1975) develops a simple model of consumer choice in which the use of SEI's by academic institutions provide an incentive for instructors to alter the gradeeffort tradeoff that students face to make it easier (less costly in terms of effort) to earn higher grades. This contributes to grade inflation and adversely affects the institution's ability to distinguish good and bad students. A search of the Chronicle's table of contents for the key words "student evaluation" yields 22 articles and notes for the year 2005 (through the end of October). A search for both "student evaluation" and "grade inflation" yields six letters and articles between 1998 and 2005 , for example, Benton (2004 . 6 Nichols and Soper [1972] ; Krautmann and Sander [1999] ; Boex [2000] ; and Kelley [1971] report a positive relationship between expected grades and evaluations, while DeCanio [1986] and Nelson and Lynch [1984] ; and evaluations are related to course grades or learning, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to study how grades and learning are jointly related to evaluations. As indicated, we also study the number of subsequent economics classes that people take as a revealed-preference measure of quality (see Hoffmann and Oreopoulos [2006] ).
Our data cover nearly fifty thousand enrollments in almost four hundred offerings of principles of microeconomics, principles of macroeconomics, and intermediate microeconomics over a decade at The Ohio State University. 7 When we estimate the effect of both current-and future course grades simultaneously we find that the current grade is correlated with student evaluations but future-course grades are not. We explore a range of explanations for this finding, and conclude that, on average, students are not aware of the amount of human capital produced in a class. Further eroding our confidence in student evaluations we find that they are unrelated to the number of subsequent economics classes that students take.
We consider how instructor characteristics are related to our measures of the quality of instruction. In some cases, female and foreign-born instructors receive lower student evaluations than male and US born instructors. Learning, however, is not related to instructor gender or national origin, nor do we find systematic differences in evaluations or student learning between non-tenure track faculty and tenure track faculty. This finding is noteworthy in light of Ehrenberg' (2004) observation that we have little or no knowledge of the effect of part-time and non tenure-track faculty on student learning and other measures of academic production. While we do not find that observable instructor characteristics are related to learning, we do find large variations across instructors in performance. This result is consistent with evidence from primary and secondary education (See Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain [2005] ).
III. Analytical Framework
Because student evaluations of teaching are the most common method of evaluating Bosshardt and Watts [2001] report weak, negative, or mixed results. 7 These courses were chosen because they are standard, they enroll the most students, and more of the students in these classes take additional economics classes. These were the only classes for which data were collected or analyzed.
instruction, we begin with a simple model of student evaluations. Our model is intended to clarify what student evaluations measure and illustrate the potential biases in estimating the determinants of evaluations. We are also interested in the extent to which rewarding instructors based on student evaluations yields desirable policy outcomes.
We focus on a representative (male) student and highlight three factors, grades, human 
. When completing evaluations, the representative student will form expectations of his grades based on feedback from the instructor, but will neither know his performance on the final examination nor will he have complete information about any curve.
denote the representative student's expectation of his grade at the time of the evaluations. The representative student's course experience, x s , represents the (dis-) utility derived from the course, including the disutility of coursework.
We assume that students give a scalar evaluation, e s , determined by the evaluation function given by:
We think of this as the student's utility function, but this assumption is not necessary for much of the analysis. Presumably, evaluations are non-decreasing in expected grades and human capital Educational psychologists have argued that if there is little effect of grades on evaluations, but a strong relationship between grades and learning, one would not want to adjust student evaluations for grades (Greenwood and Gillmore [1997] ). It is clear, however, that if evaluations are affected by grades then a policy maker would want to adjust evaluations for grades, provided that one can condition on learning. In addition to removing a source of noise in evaluations, doing so would reduce instructor incentives to inflate grades.
To further analyze the problem of interpreting student evaluations, we assume that the instructor has a technology governing the relationship between the course experience and 9 To simplify the discussion, we ignore the course experience here.
learning. We write the production possibility frontier for the instructor of section s as
Here s θ denotes an idiosyncratic instructor effect (which might be thought of as "ability"). We begin by assuming that s θ is exogenous, but discuss making it endogenous later. We assume that, for a given value of s θ , greater human capital production is associated with a less pleasant course experience for students because more work effort is required of them
. 10 To simplify the analysis, we assume that the marginal rate of transformation between the course experience and human capital is declining -when most class time is spent on producing learning, engaging material can be introduced with relatively little cost to learning, but as more and more time is spent on entertainment, learning suffers more. Figure 1 illustrates a production possibility frontier. 
This function is concave in h s and x s under our assumptions.
The instructor chooses both human capital and grades, while students choose how to evaluate her. The first order conditions for a maximum to the instructor's problem are
The first order condition for the grade says that as long as the instructor cares about evaluations and so long as higher grades lead to better evaluations, then she sets grades in the region where she receives disutility from raising grades further. At her optimum, the marginal disutility of raising grades equals the marginal utility from the increase in evaluations induced by higher grades. Variations in the marginal disutility of raising grades generate variations in grading leniency and evaluations. The first order condition for human capital says that the instructor sets h where the marginal utility of higher h equals the reduction in utility from lower evaluations.
We begin by analyzing the special case where human capital does not directly enter the instructor's utility function so that she sets h to maximize her evaluations. This case is particularly easy to characterize and provides a convenient benchmark for the more general case.
In this case h U = 0, so that the instructor sets 0
. This point is shown in Figure 1 as point a, where the instructor's production possibility frontier is tangent to the representative student's indifference curve.
If the instructor cares about human capital production directly, she will deviate from the student's optimal level of human capital. It is plausible that instructors sometimes choose content that is more difficult than the level that maximizes evaluations, either because they perceive harder content as being consistent with their duties as instructors (see below for a justification) or because they derive more utility from more rigorous content. When the instructor receives utility directly from human capital production, 0 > h U she is willing to incur a cost in the form of lowered evaluations so as to produce more human capital. In figure 1 , this corresponds to a movement along an instructor's production possibility frontier to the tangency at (b) between the production possibility frontier and the dotted indifference curve for the instructor. As shown, evaluations are lower at this point than at the one that maximizes evaluations. 11 Thus, variations in the taste for challenging content causes a downward bias in the relationship between human capital and evaluations (for a given technology), because a professor who exerts more effort producing human capital provides a worse (unmeasured) course experience.
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As indicated above, estimates of the evaluation function (2) that do not include both grades and human capital are likely to be biased. Moreover, even if measures of both grades and 11 To see this formally, note that a change in the instructor's utility function that raises h U leads the instructor to produce more human capital. That is, human capital are available, there is a problem with estimating the evaluation function (2). In particular, in order to obtain unbiased estimates of g φ and h φ in (2), the course experience s ξ must be uncorrelated with grades and human capital. Our model implies that learning may well be correlated with the course experience. An outward shift in the professor's production possibilities frontier will likely lead to higher levels of both human capital and the course experience, which would bias upward the estimate of the coefficient on learning.
Thus far we have assumed that the idiosyncratic instructor effect, or her "ability," s θ , is exogenous. However, instructors may be able to improve their teaching by exerting more effort.
To capture this possibility, we can augment the instructor's utility function to allow for a cost of 
Thus, the instructor sets the marginal cost of effort equal to its marginal benefit as measured by the change in utility from additional human capital production and/or a better course experience.
Otherwise the implications are unchanged.
Optimal Evaluation Criteria
The preceding analysis points to a number of concerns when relying on student evaluations to assess teaching effectiveness. First, to determine how student evaluations are affected by grades and learning, one must control for both variables simultaneously. Second, the effect of human capital on evaluations may be biased by a correlation between grades and the unmeasured course experience.
Student evaluations also depend on students' assessment and valuation of how much they have learned in a course. Below, we provide evidence that they may be not be well positioned to make that determination. Even if students accurately assess their learning, they may place less weight than institutions on learning relative to the course experience. For example, society and parents may place higher weight on human capital production and less weight on the course experience than students do because students discount at a high rate, or because human capital generates externalities for society. In either case, relying solely on student evaluations can distort instructors' incentives away from the social optimum.
To address these issues, we consider a social planner who places weight s λ on the student, weight I λ on the instructor, and derives benefit ( ) s h Λ from human capital (because of external effects or as a response to excessive discounting by students). The social welfare function is
The marginal rate of substitution between the course experience and human capital for a social planner who can adjust the evaluation criterion to neutralize any effect of evaluations on the instructor's utility, is
Thus, the social planner's indifference curves will be steeper than the student's indifference curves (given by x h φ φ ), but may be more or less steep than the instructor's indifference curves.
If a direct measure of human capital and unbiased estimates of g φˆ and h φˆ are available, it is possible to estimate the course experience directly. Instructors can be evaluated on the course experience they provide, the grades they assigned, and the amount of human capital they produced. With unbiased estimates of g φˆ and h φˆ, the course experience can be estimated by
With a sense of social priorities, estimates of the course experience, human capital, and grades, administrators can reward instructors based on social welfare.
IV. Data
Our data set includes students who took principles of microeconomics, principles of macroeconomics or intermediate microeconomics at The Ohio State University between 1995 and 2004. We obtained data on all subsequent economics courses taken by these students through the end of the 2004 academic year. The data set includes identifiers for the sections the students took, student demographic characteristics, and grades in all economics courses taken during this period. Student evaluations are anonymous and are available at the section level but not at the student level. Thus, we estimate the relationship between grades and evaluations at the course level rather than at the individual level, which we believe is correct for the reasons discussed above.
Our evaluation instruments contain 10 items, including an overall score, which is our primary focus. The other questions are shown in the tables and include measures of perceived learning, preparation and organization, the instructor's attitude, and the extent to which the course stimulated students to think. Table 1 shows the distribution of instructor and student characteristics for the three courses.
V. Estimation
We employ a multi-step strategy to estimate grades and learning and their relationship to student evaluations. We first estimate grades. Then we estimate the amount of learning in each section based on grades in subsequent sections. These learning estimates are of interest in their own right and we study them and also use them to estimate how grades and learning are related to evaluations. One aspect of our procedure is to collapse our individual-level data on current and subsequent grades to the section-level to be compatible with our section-level evaluations.
This section describes our procedure step-by-step in terms of principles of microeconomics, but our procedures for principles of macroeconomics and intermediate macroeconomics are similar.
Step
Estimating Grades
Let i index students and s index the base section (i.e. the particular section of principles of microeconomics that the student took). Let is g denote the grade received by student i who took base section s. In the first step, we regress is g on a vector of base section dummy variables is D v and, in some specifications, the student's characteristics at the time of the base section, is X v .
Our specification is
is is is is
The coefficient s ψ on the dummy variable for base section s gives the mean grade in the section (with or without controls for individual characteristics). These coefficients are used in our third stage to capture grades.
Step 2. Estimating Learning
To estimate learning, we use grades in subsequent courses. Let j index sections of subsequent economics courses, so that isj g denotes the grade of student i, who took base section s, in subsequent section j. We regress the grades in subsequent courses, isj g , on a vector of dummy variables for the subsequent section (to control for differences in grading across classes), 
The coefficient s θ on the dummy variable for students who took base section s indicates how well these students do in later courses. This coefficient is our measure of the learning that took place in section s. The set of controls can be varied to include measures of student ability so that s θ reflects learning, or these variables can be excluded so that the s θ indicates human capital at the end of the course. These estimates are of interest in their own right and are used in our third step to control for human capital in the section.
Evaluating Student Evaluations
In the first step, we estimated s ψ , the grades in base section s; in the second step we estimated s θ , the learning in base section s. In the last step, we regress the student evaluations for base section s, s e , on learning, grades, and instructor and section characteristics, s W v :
The coefficient h φ tells us how much students value learning (net of any costs of learning) and the coefficient g φ , how much students value high grades when evaluating the instructor. The coefficient vector ρ v tells how observable instructor characteristics are associated with evaluations.
Additional Analyses
We can also estimate a variety of related effects. We estimate the effect of instructor characteristics such as gender, native language, tenure track status, or whether or not the instructor is a graduate teaching associate, on learning. To do this, we estimate,
(****.1) As above, s W would represent the characteristics of section s, including those of the instructor.
We also assess how instructor characteristics are associated with grading leniency, by estimating,
One could estimate this model with or without s θ as a control for the effect of human capital.
VI. Findings
This section reports our estimation results for equation (***). We begin with our main results for principles of microeconomics, then discuss the results for principles of macroeconomics and intermediate microeconomics. After presenting our main results, the next sections we present a range of additional analyses.
Principles of Microeconomics
The first column of table 2 reports a regression of student evaluations on the current course grade. We find that students in sections with higher grades rate their courses more highly than those in other sections. Column 2 reports a regression with only our learning measure, i.e., future grades, which are also found to be positively associated with evaluations, but with a smaller coefficient. When both current and future course grades are included in the same regression (column 3), the effect of current grade clearly dominates, and the coefficient for future grade is small and insignificant.
The remaining columns examine a variety of other potential determinants of student evaluations. First, we include a set of instructor characteristics without controlling for the grades (column 4). Female instructors receive lower evaluations than men, as do foreign-born instructors, although this latter difference is not statistically significant. (Half as many sections are taught by foreign instructors as by women, making this estimate imprecise.) There are no discernable differences in evaluations between non-tenure track lecturers, graduate teaching associates, and tenure-track faculty.
Differences in grading practices and learning may be responsible for the gender gap in evaluations as well as the substantial (but statistically insignificant) foreign-domestic gap. To explore this possibility, we include both current and future course grades along with instructor characteristics, in column (5) of the table. The inclusion of these variables does little to the gender and foreign-domestic gaps in evaluations. The above evidence suggests that students rate women and perhaps foreign instructors less favorably than others, possibly reflecting distaste/disrespect for such instructors or unmeasured differences in the course experience like language ability or teaching style.
The regressions in columns (6) and (7) include characteristics of the students in the course and then section characteristics; column (8) reports estimates with all of these variables, year dummy variables, and the response rate for the evaluations in the section. In both regressions, the coefficient for current course grade are significant and similar in magnitude. To summarize other statistically significant findings, column (6) shows that sections with more black students rate their instructors more highly. Column (7) shows that students in night classes
give statistically significantly higher evaluations than other classes. Column (8) shows that the coefficients for blacks and night classes as well as for female instructors all are significant after fully controlling for the available variables. The foreign effect remains large, but insignificant.
The estimates in Table 2 consistently show a statistically significant effect of the current course grade. Indeed, the coefficient becomes larger as more variables are controlled.
According to column (8), a one standard-deviation change in the current course grade is associated with a large increase in evaluations -over a quarter of the standard deviation in evaluations. Once current grades are controlled, learning, as measured by future grades, is never statistically significantly related to evaluations.
Our use of the actual current course grade as a measure of expected grade in the course deserves some discussion. As indicated above students likely have some idea of what grades they will receive based on formal or informal feedback received during the quarter.
Alternatively, students may form expectations of their course grade based on the reputation the instructor's grading in previous offerings of the course. We examine this last possibility by including in our regression the lagged grade -the mean grade in the last offering of the course by the instructor -along with the current grade. Column (9) presents results without the lagged grade for the sample for which the lagged grade is available. Including lagged grade, in column (10) does not change the estimated coefficient of the current course grade or the future grade, and the coefficient for the lagged grade is itself small and statistically insignificant. It appears that students base their evaluations on indications provided by the professor about the current course rather than on the professor's reputation (at least based on recent offerings of the course).
Individual Evaluation Items
The evaluations we use have ten items, nine focusing on specific aspects of the course experience and an overall score, which has been the focus of the analysis thus far. We now turn to the individual items. The various items are highly correlated, with none of the correlations beneath .75 and most above .8 or .9.
13 Table 3 reports estimates with the individual evaluation items as the dependent variables.
The estimates for these individual items are quite similar to those for the overall evaluation measure. The current course grade is always associated with higher evaluations and the relationship is statistically significant at the 5% level in 9 of the 10 cases. None of the evaluation items is statistically significantly related to future grades. Assuming that future grades reflect learning in the current course, these findings suggest that grading leniency, but not learning, has a significant impact on student evaluations. While not always statistically significant, women and foreign instructors tend to receive lower evaluations, black students tend to give higher evaluations, and honors and night classes tend to give higher evaluations.
Evaluations on organization and preparation have the weakest relationship with current grades. It is also noteworthy that the item that captures learning, "Learned greatly from instructor" is no more closely related to future grades than any of the other items. This finding suggests that students are not able to evaluate the amount they learn in a course or that they base their estimates on the grades that the expect to receive. Alternatively, the later course grade may not be a good proxy for learning in the current course perhaps because what is learned in the current course has little bearing on later course, a possibility we consider below.
Principles of Macroeconomics
This section reports results for principles of macroeconomics. These results are presented in the same order as those for principles of microeconomics and are generally consistent with those for principles of microeconomics. We note that there are only 60% as many macro-13 Sarwark et al. (1995) point out that instructor "halo" effects may affect all items.
principles sections as there are micro-principles sections and that fewer of the students in macroprinciples take subsequent classes, so the estimates for macro-principles are somewhat less precise than those for micro-principles.
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The estimates in the top panel of Appendix Table 1 show that grades in the current course are strongly related to student evaluations for later courses. In fact, the estimates are slightly larger than those for micro-principles. Grades in future courses are unrelated to evaluations, whether they are included on their own or with the current course grade. Again women and foreign born instructors tend to receive lower evaluations than men and domestic instructors, but these differences are not systematically statistically significant.
The top panel of Appendix Table 2 reports estimates for each of the individual survey items. These estimates show a positive relationship between grades in the macro-principles section and grades in subsequent courses for all ten survey items (the relationships are statistically significant at the 5% level in 7 of the 10 cases). There is no evidence of a positive relationship between grades in later courses and any of the evaluation items. As with microprinciples, the weak relationship between grades and later courses holds true for the item "learned greatly." As above, there is some tendency for foreign instructors to receive lower evaluations.
Intermediate Microeconomics
This section presents results for intermediate microeconomics. Again, there are fewer intermediate economics sections than micro-principles (under half as many) or macro-principles (three quarters as many) and fewer students take later classes making the estimates noisier.
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Bearing this caveat in mind, the estimates in the bottom panel of Appendix Table 1 consistently show a positive relationship between current course grades and evaluations. Some of the intermediate microeconomics sections use calculus. Calculus based sections receive higher evaluations, the students in these sections tend to receive higher grades, and they tend to receive higher grades in future courses (both of these results are in Table 7 and are discussed below). Controlling for whether the course was calculus-based increases the relationship between current grades and evaluations and generates a negative (but insignificant) relationship between later grades and evaluations.
The bottom panel of Appendix Table 2 
Summary
The highlights of what we found so far are:
1. We consistently find a positive relationship between grades in the current course and evaluations. This finding is robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls.
2. There is no evidence of a positive relationship between learning and evaluations controlling for current course grades.
3. Learning is no more related to student evaluations of the amount learned in the course than it is to student evaluations of other aspects of the course.
4. In some cases women and foreign-born instructors receive lower evaluations than other instructors, all else equal.
VII. Do Future Grades Capture Learning?
On the assumption that our measure of learning as valid, the preceding findings imply that grading leniency is an important determinant of evaluations and that students do not reward 15 Many business majors require intermediate microeconomics, but no additional classes.
instructors who generate learning per se. We offer six alternative explanations for these findings.
First, they may indicate that grades in future courses are noisy measures of learning.
Second, they may indicate that there is selection into courses -for instance, the least able students may disproportionately take courses from the instructors with the best student evaluations, biasing downward our estimates of learning for the best instructors. Third, our results for future grades may reflect selection into future classes. Recall that we only observe future grades for students who take subsequent economics classes. Students who do well in one economics class may be more likely to take future economics classes. If more highly rated professors make economics more attractive particularly for students with low economics ability, the relationship between grades and the number of future classes taken will be weaker for students taking classes from the highly rated professors. In this case, our future grades measure will be biased downward for highly rated instructors relative to less highly rated professors, leading us to underestimate the effect of learning on evaluations. We will examine this possibility. A fourth explanation is that students from more highly rated professors may be induced into taking more difficult future classes. We will also examine this possibility. A fifth interpretation is that the costs to students in courses where they learn much may offset the benefits they perceive. Lastly, students may be unable to gauge how much they have learned in their classes. The weak relationship between grades in future courses and the item that specifically captures learning, suggests that the last explanation may be the right one. We investigate these explanations below.
Precision of our Leaning Measure
Our estimates of learning may be noisy because of sampling error. To address this possibility, we estimate the share of the variance in our estimate of learning in each section that is common to all students in the section as opposed to sampling error. To do this, we split each class into two equally-sized halves and calculate the covariance between learning in each half. where I s denotes a vector of dummy variables for the instructors teaching the base section. It seems reasonable to assume that learning varies across sections and across instructors. Under this assumption, we expect section dummy variables and instructor dummy variables to be statistically significantly related to our learning measure (i.e., future grades). Table 4 reports results for the three courses. As shown in the top panel, there is substantial variation in learning across sections -the standard deviations range between .2 and .3 grade points. Moreover, between 74% and 88% of the variance in future grades is due to section level learning, so our estimates of learning are quite precise. When we estimate (**), including controls for section characteristics, F-tests for the joint significance of the base-section dummy variables soundly reject the null hypothesis that base-section grades are not important determinants of future grades. For all three courses, the P-values are less than .0001.
As shown in the lower panel, more than half of the section-learning effects for principles of macroeconomics and intermediate microeconomics are due to instructor effects. Instructors account for 44% of the variation in the section-learning effects for principles of microeconomics We also reject the null hypothesis of no instructor effects, with a P-value less than .0001 for macro-principles and with P-values of .001 for micro-principles and .015 for intermediate microeconomics.
Based on these results, we conclude that although they contain a small amount of measurement error, grades in future courses are a valuable measure of learning in base-sections.
The substantial variations in learning across sections and the strong effect of instructors on learning are also noteworthy and indicate the importance of evaluating instructors based on the learning that they produce.
Selection
This section considers whether selection may bias our estimates. There are a number of selection arguments. The most simple is that there may be selection into base sections, so that variations in learning and grades are due to differences in student ability. We have addressed this argument by including SAT and ACT scores for the students for whom these scores are available in our regressions (*) and (**). Doing so reduced the sample size and had little impact on the estimates.
Selection into Future Classes
There are other selection arguments. For instance, the effect of future grades on evaluations may be biased downward because students with low ability in economics take more additional economics courses after taking a course from a highly rated instructor than after taking a course from a less highly rated instructor. To test this hypothesis, we estimate Tobit models of the number of future courses that student i in section s takes, Future Class is . Our first model is, gives the grade received by student i in section s and s Φ denotes a set of section dummy variables, which are estimated explicitly and account for differences across base sections in the probability of taking future courses. With section fixed effects, the instructor and section characteristics (including the direct effect of student evaluations) are captured by the section fixed effects. The parameter β gives the difference between the number of subsequent economics courses taken by students with higher grades relative to those with worse grades. The parameter π , on the interaction between grades and evaluations, is of particular interest. If 0 > π ( 0 < π ), then the relationship between students' grades and the number of future courses taken is stronger (weaker) in sections with higher evaluations.
While one might have expected that students from sections with higher evaluations would be particularly likely to take additional economics classes, the estimates reported in the odd numbered columns of table 5 show little relationship between student evaluations and the number of subsequent economics classes taken. The estimates for principles of microeconomics and intermediate microeconomics are both positive but statistically insignificant, while the estimate for principles of macroeconomics is negative and statistically significant. Thus, there is no evidence that students take more classes after having more highly rated instructors. This finding is somewhat disturbing from a revealed preference perspective if student evaluations are supposed to capture the quality of instruction. Students who take classes from foreign-born instructors and lecturers are less likely to take future classes.
The estimates in the even-numbered columns of the table show a strong positive relationship between grades in the current course and the number of subsequent economics classes taken for students in principles of microeconomics and principles of macroeconomics.
The relationship is negative but insignificant for students in intermediate microeconomics courses. On the other hand, the relationship between grades and the probability of taking future courses does not depend on evaluations in any of the three types of classes. Here too, there is little evidence that selection explains the weak relationship between grades in subsequent classes and student evaluations.
We also estimate our learning measure using a formal selection model. For these estimates, we look at students who took principles of microeconomics as their first principles course and their grades in principles of macroeconomics. Our instruments for whether people take subsequent classes, which were excluded from the future grade equation, are a set of interactions between the college that housed the student's major at the time of enrollment in principles of microeconomics and time (and its square). This is a good instrument, because it reflects exogenous changes in the requirements of majors and advising practices. We included college dummy variables in the equations for taking principles of macroeconomics and in the grade equation for principles of macroeconomics, so the selection model is estimated from variations over time in the share of principles of microeconomics students taking principles of macroeconomics within majors.
The results, which are quite similar to those in table 2, are reported in Appendix Table 3 .
Consistent with the previous results, there is a strong relationship between student evaluations and grades, which is unaffected by the inclusion of learning. While learning measures are positively related to evaluations without controls for grades, the relationship becomes small and is statistically insignificant when grades are included in the regression equation.
The Difficulty of Future Courses Taken
Another selection argument focuses on the particular classes that people take. Although we have no reason to believe that it is the case, it is at least possible that students who take a course from a more highly rated professor choose to take additional classes that are more difficult than do students whose prior course is from a less highly-rated instructor. While our estimates of learning based on future grades include course fixed effects, if a disproportionate share of the people from a particular class take a course that yields lower average grades for the same amount of achievement, it will lead us to underestimate learning from those sections. The estimates are reported in Table 6 . For principles of microeconomics we find no relationship between student evaluations and the probability of taking the more mathematical intermediate microeconomics course. For principles of macroeconomics the estimates indicate that students in more highly rated sections are less likely to take the more mathematical intermediate microeconomics course. As indicated, a priori we have no reason to expect a relationship in either direction, but these estimates indicate that our finding of no relationship between evaluations and learning is not due to this potential source of bias. Overall, we conclude that there is little evidence that selection can account for the weak relationship between evaluations and learning reported above.
VIII. Learning and Grades
Our estimates show that there are large variations in learning across sections and that instructor effects account for much of this variation. This section considers how observable instructor characteristics are related to our learning measure. We also study how current grades are related to learning and instructor characteristics. These are estimates of equations (****.1) and (****.2). Given that controlling for current grades eliminates the relationship between learning and evaluations, we anticipate that learning and current course grades are positively correlated.
The results are reported in table 7. The first three columns report results for principles of microeconomics. They show no systematic differences across instructors in current course grades. Students who took principles of microeconomics from a foreign-born instructor or a lecturer are found to do better in subsequent classes. As expected, we find that grades in the current course are positively related to grades in future courses. This finding is consistent with instructors giving higher grades to students who know more at the end of the course.
Results for principles of macroeconomics, reported in columns (4) through (6), show that none of the observable instructor characteristics are related to subsequent grades, but that women tend to give lower grades while graduate teaching associates and instructors with Ph.D.s tend to give higher grades. As shown in column (5), grades in later courses are strongly associated with higher grades in the current course, but the previous results are robust to controlling for grades in later courses.
Results for intermediate microeconomics, reported in columns (7) through (9) show that none of the instructor characteristics is statistically significantly related to current grades.
Students who took intermediate microeconomics from a foreign-born instructor tend to receive lower grades in later courses. Otherwise, none of the observable instructor characteristics is statistically significantly related to grades in later courses. As before, the current course grades are positively related to grades in future courses.
It is noteworthy that we generally find large instructor effects, but that the estimates in Table 7 show no consistent relationship between observable instructor characteristics and grades in future courses. This finding parallels the literature on teacher effects in primary and secondary schools, where teacher effects are found to be large, but observable teacher characteristics have only weak effects (see, for example, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain [2005] ). Thus here, as in that literature, the characteristics of instructors that matter the most are unobservable.
IX. Optimal Evaluation Criteria
As indicated it is possible to construct alternative evaluation criteria based on learning and the course experience, which can be estimated from equation (3) provided that consistent estimates of unbiased estimates of g φˆ and h φˆ, in (3) and (***) are available. 16 This section considers a range of alternative criteria. To do this, table 8 reports the correlation between the raw student evaluations and these other criteria, with a lower correlation implying a greater discrepancy between the raw student evaluations and the alternative criteria.
The second row in each panel show the course experience, estimated from (3). These estimates are based on the regression reported in column 8 of table 2 and Appendix Table 1 . The correlation between these variables and the overall rating ranges from .7 to .9, so simply adjusting for grades, learning, section, student, and instructor characteristics has a substantial impact on ratings. The third row in each panel shows the correlations with learning . Given the preceding results, it is not surprising that these correlations are consistently low and frequently negative, but the implications of this result are striking. It says that a social planner who cared only about learning would want to disregard student evaluations (or, disregarding behavioral responses, reward instructors slightly for low evaluations!).
The last row in each panel assumes that the social planner places equal weight on the student's experience and learning. Here the correlations with evaluations range between .4 and .6, indicating that roughly half of the variation in evaluations is noise to a planner with this objective. We believe that these results are conservative insofar as it is likely that society places substantially more weight on learning than the course experience.
16 As indicated, the evidence above suggests that students have little information about the amount that they have
X. Conclusions
We have shown that student evaluations differ from the ideal construct, because they do not appear to reflect learning, but are sensitive to grading leniency. Even if they did not suffer from these two problems, it is unlikely that SEI scores would properly weight learning relative to the course experience -they would do so only if student placed the same weight on these items as the social planner. Moreover, there is evidence that evaluations vary with class characteristics, including the type of section and composition of the class, and some evidence that students give lower evaluations to women and to foreign-born instructors.
Guarding against grading leniency is relatively simple (at least when evaluations do not reflect learning as is the case in our data). One simply needs to adjust evaluations for current and future grades using a simple regression procedure. Similarly, it is straightforward to estimate learning from administrative records on performance in subsequent classes. If one is willing to choose how much weight should be placed on learning relative to the course experience, it is possible to construct instructor-performance measures that reflect both variables. Evaluations could easily be adjusted for class characteristics and, depending on whether one believes that the lower scores received by women and foreign-born instructors reflect gender-or ethnicdiscrimination as opposed to unobserved teaching attributes, evaluations could also be adjusted for instructor characteristics.
Beyond the issues discussed here, any evaluation method will be affected by sampling error. Extremely high or low evaluations may be cause of concern, but moderate variations in between evaluation scores are not. We have not addressed growth or decline in teacher evaluations for individual instructors. Once again, a high rate of change merits attention, but it is unclear if moderate changes contain useful information. We have identified problems with student evaluations and proposed a number of modifications. If they are used at all to measure teaching "quality, we believe that any student evaluations are best used in conjunction with peer reviews of teaching. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. For principles of microeconomics, the F-statistic with 334 and 34681 degrees of freedom is 6.14, yielding a P-value beneath .0001. For principles of macroeconomics, the F-statistic with 300 and 21373 degrees of freedom is 6.38, yielding a P-value beneath .0001. For intermediate microeconomics, the Fstatistic with 152 and 10706 degrees of freedom is 4.69, yielding a P-value beneath .0001. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Table 2 , which controls for human capital and grading leniency. Learning (regression adjusted) is the residual of a regression like that in column (3) of Table 3 but with only section characteristics and without instructor characteristics. WFH Rating = 0.5*Course Experience/SD(Course Experience) + 0.5*Learning/SD(Learning), where SD denotes the standard deviation of the relevant variable. Thus, it is a criterion where the course experience and learning receive equal weight.
Appendix Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include student characteristics, class characteristics, the response rate, and year dummy variables. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Our instruments for whether people take principles of macroeconomics are interactions between the college that housed the student's major at the time of enrollment in principles of microeconomics and time (and its square). The reported estimates include dummy variables for the colleges.
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